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Abstract We show that if an agent reasons according to standard inference rules,
the truth and introspection axioms extend from the set of non-epistemic propositions
to the whole set of propositions. This implies that the usual axiomatization of part-
itional possibility correspondences is redundant, and provides a justification for truth
and introspection that is partly based on reasoning.
Keywords Knowledge · Introspection · Truth axiom · Partitional information
structures · Epistemic game theory
JEL Classification D80 · D83 · D89
1 Introduction
The information of an agent who processes information rationally is commonly rep-
resented by a partition over a state space. This representation is fundamental in many
areas of Game Theory, such as modeling of games with incomplete information
(Harsanyi 1967–1968), the study common knowledge (Aumann 1976), and epistemic
O. Gossner
Paris School of Economics, Paris, France
O. Gossner
London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
e-mail: ogossner@ens.fr
E. Tsakas (B)
Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands
e-mail: e.tsakas@maastrichtuniversity.nl
123
514 O. Gossner, E. Tsakas
foundations of solution concepts such as correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1987) and
Nash equilibrium (Aumann and Brandenburger 1995).
The usual axiomatization for partitional state spaces is that of an agent whose
knowledge satisfies truth and introspection (Fagin et al. 1995; Samet 1990; Aumann
1999). The truth axiom says that any proposition known to the agent is true. According
to the introspection axioms, the agent knows both what he knows and what he does
not know.
It is generally admitted that the agent’s capacity to draw logical inferences is part of
the properties that define the agent’s rationality (e.g., see Geanakoplos 1989). However,
it is not clear why a rational agent should also be endowed with introspective abilities.
The objective of this note is to investigate to what extent truth and introspection can
be explained by a deductive process on the part of the agent.
We consider an agent who observes natural facts about the surrounding world. These
natural facts are those described by non-epistemic—else called Boolean—propositions
and correspond to sentences that do not involve the agent’s own knowledge. The agent
also observes his own knowledge about natural facts, i.e., he knows what he knows
and what he does not know about natural facts.
We show that the truth and introspection axioms are then satisfied for every prop-
osition, whether epistemic or not. Since we only assume truth and introspection for
non-epistemic propositions, our result provides a justification for these axioms for all
other propositions that is based on deductive reasoning.
We express our results in terms of axiomatizations of knowledge. Formally, we
show that the knowledge induced by the standard axiomatization of syntactic knowl-
edge, S5, remains unchanged if truth and introspection are assumed for non-epistemic
propositions only. In this sense, our result shows that the usual axiomatization S5
is redundant, as it can be replaced by a strict subset of axioms. In case there is a
finite number of non-epistemic propositions, our axiomatization assumes truth and
introspection for a finite set of propositions, instead of a countable set in the usual
axiomatization of S5.
The axiomatic model and main result are presented in Sect. 2. We present a discus-
sion in Sect. 3: In Sect. 3.1, we recall the connection between S5 and partitional models,
in Sect. 3.2 we discuss the tightness of the weaker axiomatization presented, in Sect.
3.3 we explain why our result is not a consequence of the well-known equivalence in
S5 between every proposition and a proposition of epistemic depth at most one.
2 Model and main result
We recall the standard syntactic model of knowledge (Chellas 1980; Fagin et al. 1995).
Let  be the alphabet of the agent’s language, called the set of atomic propositions.
These atomic propositions express basic facts about nature such as “it is raining in
New York”, or “the cat is mortal”. The set of non-epistemic (else called Boolean)
propositions L0() is the closure of  with respect to the standard connectives of
negation, ¬, and conjunction, ∧.
The knowledge operator is denoted by K , and Kφ stands for “the agent knows
φ”. The set of all propositions L(), with generic elements φ,ψ , is the closure of 
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with respect to ¬,∧ and K . The propositions φ ∨ ψ, φ → ψ and φ ↔ ψ stand for
¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ),¬φ ∨ ψ , and (φ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ) respectively.
We recall the standard Modal Logic (ML) system S5, consisting of the following
axioms and inference rules:
A1. All tautologies of propositional calculus
A2.
(
Kφ ∧ K (φ → ψ)) → Kψ (Axiom of distribution)
A3. Kφ → φ (Truth axiom)
A4. Kφ → K Kφ (Positive introspection)
A5. ¬Kφ → K¬Kφ (Negative introspection)
R1. From φ and (φ → ψ) infer ψ (Modus Ponens)
R2. From φ infer Kφ (Rule of necessitation)
The first axiom, A1, refers to propositions such as (φ → ψ) ↔ (¬ψ → ¬φ), which
are always logically true; A2 says that if the agent knows that φ implies ψ , and knows
φ, then he necessarily knows ψ ; the truth axiom says that the agent cannot wrongly
know a proposition; positive introspection states that the agent knows what he knows,
whereas negative introspection says that the agent knows what he does not know. In
the literature, an axiom typically holds for every φ ∈ L(), e.g., A3 is commonly
understood as the set of propositions {Kφ → φ | φ ∈ L()}. Throughout the paper,
we study the implications of explicitly restricting an axiom to hold for some propo-
sitions only, e.g., if we say that A3 holds for all propositions in  ⊆ L(), we have
in mind a system where the propositions in {Kφ → φ | φ ∈ } are axioms, whereas
the ones in {Kφ → φ | φ ∈ L() \ } are not.
The propositions that can be proven from the axioms, or from other propositions
that have already been proven, are called theorems. Formally, the set of theorems is the
closure of the axioms with respect to the inference rules. We say that two ML systems
are equivalent whenever they have the same set of theorems. A system is redundant if
there is an equivalent system with a strictly smaller (with respect to inclusion) set of
axioms, and the same inference rules.
Let T5 denote the set of theorems in S5. We show that S5 is redundant, in that the
same set of theorems, T5, is obtained if Truth and Introspection are axioms only for the
non-epistemic propositions. Formally, let S50 be the system consisting of the axioms:
A1–A2 for all propositions in L(), and
A3–A5 for all propositions in L0(),
together with the usual inference rules R1 and R2 for every proposition. We let T 05
denote the set of theorems in S50, and we show that S5 and S50 are equivalent. Both
in S5 and in S50, R1 and R2 apply to every proposition.
Main Theorem T 05 = T5.
2.1 Proof of the Main Theorem
The general strategy of the proof is to show that (i) the set of propositions that satisfy
truth and introspection is closed under a number of operations, and (ii) these operations
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are sufficient to generate the whole set of propositions starting from the non-epistemic
propositions only. It is relatively straightforward to show that A3–A5 for φ and ¬φ
imply A3–A5 for Kφ and ¬Kφ (Lemma 2), and that A3–A5 for φ and ψ imply A3–A5
for φ ∧ ψ (Lemma 3). However, it is not true in general that the set of propositions
that satisfy A3–A5 is closed under ∨. Instead, we show that if φ,ψ satisfy truth and
introspection, so do Kφ ∨ ψ and ¬Kφ ∨ ψ (Lemma 5).
We divide the proof of the Main Theorem into a series of lemmata.
Definition 1 For some  ⊆ L(), let S5() denote the ML system consisting of
• the axioms A1–A2 for all propositions in L(),
• the axioms A3–A5 for all propositions in , and
• the inference rules R1–R2 for all propositions in L().
and we let T5() denote the set of Theorems in S5().
Note that for  ⊆  ′ ⊆ L(), T5() ⊆ T5( ′).
Remark 1 In the proofs, we make repeated use of some well-known facts such as
(i) (Kφ ∧ Kψ) ↔ K (φ ∧ ψ) is in T5(∅), and for every  ⊆ L(), (ii) if φ → ψ is
in T5(), then so is ¬ψ → ¬φ, (iii) if φ → φ′ and φ′ → φ′′ are in T5(), then so is
φ → φ′′ (iv) if K (φ → ψ) is in T5(), then so is Kφ → Kψ .
In a series of lemmata, we prove Theorems in S5() for some subsets  of L().
Unless  is sufficiently rich, for instance if  = ∅, it can be the case that in T5(),
every proposition and its contrary is known to the agent. Our first lemma below shows
that this cannot be the case if  contains a contradiction, such as1 ψ ∧ ¬ψ .
Lemma 1 For every φ,ψ ∈ L(), (Kφ → ¬K¬φ) ∈ T5({ψ ∧ ¬ψ}).
Proof By A3 applied to (ψ∧¬ψ), and since ¬(ψ∧¬ψ) is a tautology of propositional
calculus, ¬K (ψ ∧¬ψ) ∈ T5({ψ ∧¬ψ}). The proposition (φ ∧¬φ) → (ψ ∧¬ψ) is
also a tautology of propositional calculus, hence belongs to T5({ψ ∧¬ψ}). Thus, both
K ((φ ∧ ¬φ) → (ψ ∧ ¬ψ)) and ¬K (ψ ∧ ¬ψ) are in T5({ψ ∧ ¬ψ}), which implies
by A2 that ¬K (φ ∧ ¬φ) ∈ T5({ψ ∧ ¬ψ}). This can be rewritten (¬Kφ ∨ ¬K¬φ) ∈
T5({ψ ∧ ¬ψ}), or (Kφ → ¬K¬φ) ∈ T5({ψ ∧ ¬ψ}). 
unionsq
Lemma 2 For every φ,ψ ∈ L():
1. A3–A5 for Kφ are in T5({φ}),
2. A3–A5 for ¬Kφ are in T5({φ,ψ ∧ ¬ψ}).
Proof We start with 1:
A3 : A3 for φ gives (Kφ → φ) ∈ T5({φ}). By R2, K (Kφ → φ) ∈ T5({φ}). Thus,
(K Kφ → Kφ) ∈ T5({φ}).
A4 : By A4 applied to φ, (Kφ → K Kφ) ∈ T5({φ}). By R2, K (Kφ → K Kφ) ∈
T5({φ}), and (K Kφ → K K Kφ) ∈ T5({φ}).




A5 : By A4 for φ, (Kφ → K Kφ) ∈ T5({φ}), hence (¬K Kφ → ¬Kφ) ∈ T5({φ}).
A5 for φ gives (¬Kφ → K¬Kφ) ∈ T5({φ}), and (¬K Kφ → K¬Kφ) ∈
T5({φ}). By A3 for Kφ already proven above, (K Kφ → Kφ) ∈ T5({φ}), so that
(¬Kφ → ¬K Kφ) ∈ T5({φ}), and by R2, K (¬Kφ → ¬K Kφ) ∈ T5({φ}) and
(K¬Kφ → K¬K Kφ) ∈ T5({φ}). Combining the two, we obtain (¬K Kφ →
K¬K Kφ) ∈ T5({φ}).
Now, 2:
A3 : A4 applied to φ gives (Kφ → K Kφ) ∈ T5({φ}), and Lemma 1 applied to Kφ
shows (K Kφ → ¬K¬Kφ) ∈ T5({ψ ∧ ¬ψ}). Hence (Kφ → ¬K¬Kφ) ∈
T5({φ,ψ ∧ ¬ψ}), and by contraposal (K¬Kφ → ¬Kφ) ∈ T5({φ,ψ ∧ ¬ψ}).
A4 : A5 for φ gives (¬Kφ → K¬Kφ) ∈ T5({φ}). By R2, K (¬Kφ → K¬Kφ) ∈
T5({φ}), hence (K¬Kφ → K K¬Kφ) ∈ T5({φ}).
A5 : A5 applied to φ gives (¬Kφ → K¬Kφ) ∈ T5({φ}), hence (¬K¬Kφ → Kφ) ∈
T5({φ}). Using A4 for φ and Kφ (proven above) we obtain (Kφ → K K Kφ) ∈
T5({φ}). From Lemma 1, (K Kφ → ¬K¬Kφ) ∈ T5({ψ ∧ ¬ψ}), hence by
R2 K (K Kφ → ¬K¬Kφ) ∈ T5({ψ ∧ ¬ψ}) and K K Kφ → K¬K¬Kφ ∈




Lemma 3 For every φ,ψ ∈ L(), A3–A5 for φ ∧ ψ are in T5({φ,ψ}).
Proof A3 :
(
K (φ ∧ ψ) → (Kφ ∧ Kψ)) ∈ T5({∅}). By A3 for φ,ψ , Kφ → φ
and Kψ → ψ are in T5({φ,ψ}), and so is
(
Kφ ∧ Kψ) → (φ ∧ ψ). Hence(
K (φ ∧ ψ) → (φ ∧ ψ)) ∈ T5({φ,ψ}).
A4 : K (φ ∧ ψ) → (Kφ ∧ Kψ) and K Kφ ∧ K Kψ → K (Kφ ∧ Kψ) are in
∈ T5({∅}). By A4 applied to φ and ψ, Kφ → K Kφ and Kψ → K Kψ , and
also Kφ∧Kψ → K Kφ∧K Kψ are in T5({φ,ψ}). It follows that
(
K (φ∧ψ) →
K K (φ ∧ ψ)) ∈ T5({φ,ψ}).
A5 : (¬K (φ ∧ ψ) → ¬Kφ ∨ ¬Kψ) ∈ T5({∅}). By A5 for φ and ψ,¬Kφ →
K¬Kφ,¬Kψ → K¬Kψ , hence also ¬Kφ ∨ ¬Kψ → K¬Kφ ∨ K¬Kψ
are in T5({φ,ψ}). Since both K¬Kφ → K (¬Kφ ∨ ¬Kψ) and K¬Kψ →
K (¬Kφ ∨¬Kψ) are in T5(∅), so is K¬Kφ ∨ K¬Kψ → K (¬Kφ ∨¬Kψ).
Finally, ¬Kφ ∨ ¬Kψ → ¬K (φ ∧ ψ), and also, by R2, K (¬Kφ ∨ ¬Kψ) →




Lemma 4 For every φ,ψ ∈ L(), K (Kφ ∨ ψ) ↔ (Kφ ∨ Kψ) is in T5({φ}).
Proof ← : By A4 for φ, (Kφ → K Kφ) ∈ T5({φ}), so (Kφ∨Kψ → K Kφ∨Kψ) ∈
T5({φ}). Since K Kφ → K (Kφ ∨ψ) and Kψ → K (Kφ ∨ψ) are in T5({∅}), so
is K Kφ∨ Kψ → K (Kφ∨ψ). It follows that ((Kφ∨ Kψ) → K (Kφ∨ψ))) ∈
T5({φ}).
→ : K (Kφ ∨ ψ) → K (¬Kφ → ψ), K (¬Kφ → ψ) → (K¬Kφ →
Kψ), (K¬Kφ → Kψ) → (¬K¬Kφ ∨ Kψ) are in T5({∅}), hence so is
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K (Kφ ∨ ψ) → (¬K¬Kφ ∨ Kψ). By A5 applied to φ, (¬K¬Kφ → Kφ) ∈
T5({φ}), thus, (K (Kφ ∨ ψ) → Kφ ∨ Kψ) ∈ T5({φ}).

unionsq
Lemma 5 For every φ,ψ,ψ ′ ∈ L(),
1. A3–A5 for Kφ ∨ ψ are in T5({φ,ψ}),
2. A3–A5 for ¬Kφ ∨ ψ are in T5({φ,ψ,ψ ′ ∧ ¬ψ ′}).
Proof First, for Kφ ∨ ψ :
A3 : From Lemma 4, (K (Kφ ∨ ψ) → Kφ ∨ Kψ) ∈ T5({φ}). By A3 applied to
ψ, Kψ → ψ ∈ T5({ψ}). Thus, (K (Kφ ∨ ψ) → Kφ ∨ ψ) ∈ T5({φ,ψ}).
A4 : From Lemma 4, (K (Kφ ∨ ψ) → Kφ ∨ Kψ) ∈ T5({φ}). By A4 applied to
φ, to Kφ (Lemma 2) and to ψ, Kφ → K K Kφ and Kψ → K Kψ are in
T5({φ,ψ}). Hence, (Kφ ∨ Kψ) → K K Kφ ∨ K Kψ ∈ T5({φ,ψ}). Both
K K Kφ → K (K Kφ ∨ Kψ) and K Kψ → K (K Kφ ∨ Kψ) are in T5({∅}),
hence so is K K Kφ ∨ K Kψ → K (K Kφ ∨ Kψ). Similarly, K Kφ ∨ Kψ →
K (Kφ ∨ ψ) ∈ T5({φ}), so, from R2, K (K Kφ ∨ Kψ) → K K (Kφ ∨ ψ) ∈
T5({φ}). We conclude that (K (Kφ ∨ ψ) → K K (Kφ ∨ ψ)) ∈ T5({φ,ψ}).
A5 : From Lemma 4, (Kφ ∨ Kψ) ↔ K (Kφ ∨ ψ), hence also ¬K (Kφ ∨ ψ) ↔
¬(Kφ ∨ Kψ) and ¬K (Kφ ∨ψ) ↔ (¬Kφ ∧¬Kψ) are in T5({φ}). By A5 for
φ and ψ,¬Kφ → K¬Kφ ∈ T5({φ}),¬Kψ → K¬Kψ ∈ T5({ψ}), hence
¬Kφ ∧ ¬Kψ → K (¬Kφ ∧ ¬Kψ) ∈ T5({φ,ψ}). By R2 applied to ¬Kφ ∧
¬Kψ → ¬K (Kφ ∨ ψ) ∈ T5({∅}), K (¬Kφ ∧ ¬Kψ) → K¬K (Kφ ∨ ψ) ∈
T5({∅}). We conclude that (¬K (Kφ ∨ ψ) → K¬K (Kφ ∨ ψ)) ∈ T5({φ,ψ}).
Now, for ¬Kφ ∨ ψ :
A3 : By A5 for φ,¬Kφ ∨ ψ → K¬Kφ ∨ ψ , and, by R2, also K (¬Kφ ∨ ψ) →
K (K¬Kφ ∨ ψ) are in T5({φ}). By Lemma 4, (K (K¬Kφ ∨ ψ) → K¬Kφ ∨
Kψ) ∈ T5({¬Kφ}), and by Lemma 2, T5({¬Kφ}) ⊆ T5({φ,ψ ′∧¬ψ ′}). Since
A3 for ¬Kφ and for ψ are in T5({φ,ψ,ψ ′ ∧ ¬ψ ′}), so is K¬Kφ ∨ Kψ →
¬Kφ ∨ ψ . We conclude that K (¬Kφ ∨ ψ) → ¬Kφ ∨ ψ ∈ T5({φ,ψ,ψ ′ ∧
¬ψ ′}).
A4 : As in the previous point, (K (¬Kφ ∨ ψ) → K¬Kφ ∨ Kψ) ∈ T5({φ}). Since
A4 for ¬Kφ is in T5({φ,ψ ′ ∧¬ψ ′}), so is K¬Kφ ∨ Kψ → K K¬Kφ ∨ Kψ .
By Lemma 4, K K¬Kφ ∨ Kψ → K (K¬Kφ ∨ Kψ) is in T5({ψ}). Finally,
K¬Kφ → K (¬Kφ ∨ ψ) and Kψ → K (¬Kφ ∨ ψ) are in T5({∅}), thus, so
is K¬Kφ ∨ Kψ → K (¬Kφ ∨ ψ), and so is, by R2, K (K¬Kφ ∨ Kψ) →
K K (¬Kφ ∨ ψ). We conclude that K (¬Kφ ∨ ψ) → K K (¬Kφ ∨ ψ) is in
T5({φ,ψ,ψ ′ ∧ ¬ψ ′}).
A5 : From Lemma 4, (K¬Kφ ∨ Kψ → K (K¬Kφ ∨ ψ)) ∈ T5({ψ}). By
A3 for ¬Kφ (Lemma 2), K¬Kφ ∨ ψ → ¬Kφ ∨ ψ , hence by R2 also
K (K¬Kφ ∨ ψ) → K (¬Kφ ∨ ψ) are in T5({φ,ψ ′ ∧ ¬ψ ′}). We deduce
that K¬Kφ ∨ Kψ → K (¬Kφ ∨ ψ) and its contraposive ¬K (¬Kφ ∨ ψ) →
¬K¬Kφ∧¬Kψ are in T5({φ,ψ,ψ ′ ∧¬ψ ′}). By A5 for ¬Kφ (Lemma 2) and
for ψ, (¬K¬Kφ ∧¬Kψ → K (¬K¬Kφ ∧¬Kψ)) ∈ T5({φ,ψ,ψ ′ ∧¬ψ ′}),
and thus, (¬K¬Kφ∧¬Kψ → K¬(K¬Kφ∨ Kψ)) ∈ T5({φ,ψ,ψ ′ ∧¬ψ ′}).
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By A5 for φ,¬Kφ ∨ ψ → K¬Kφ ∨ ψ in T5({φ}), and by R2 so is
K (¬Kφ ∨ ψ) → K (K¬Kφ ∨ ψ). By Lemma 4, (K (K¬Kφ ∨ ψ) →
K¬Kφ ∨ Kψ) ∈ T5({¬Kφ}) ⊆ T5({φ,ψ ′ ∧ ¬ψ ′}). We deduce that both
K (¬Kφ ∨ ψ) → K¬Kφ ∨ Kψ , its contraposive ¬(K¬Kφ ∨ Kψ) →
¬K (¬Kφ ∨ ψ), and, by R2, K¬(K¬Kφ ∨ Kψ) → K¬K (¬Kφ ∨ ψ) are in
T5({φ,ψ,ψ ′ ∧¬ψ ′}). We conclude that ¬K (¬Kφ∨ψ) → K¬K (¬Kφ∨ψ)
is in T5({φ,ψ,ψ ′ ∧ ¬ψ ′}).

unionsq
We recursively define the set of propositions of epistemic depth at most n, by for
n ≥ 1,Ln() = L0({φ, Kφ | φ ∈ Ln−1()}). Thus, L0() is the set of non-episte-
mic propositions, and Ln() is the closure of {φ, Kφ | φ ∈ n−1} with respect to the
logical connectives.
Lemma 6 For every n ≥ 1 and φ ∈ Ln(), A3–A5 for φ are in T5(Ln−1()).
Proof Fix any ψ ′ ∈ , and note that ψ ′ ∧¬ψ ′ ∈ L0(), so that A3–A5 for ψ ′ ∧¬ψ ′
are in T5(Ln()) for every n.
For φ ∈ Ln(), there exist integers k, l1, . . . lk and, a family (φi, j )i≤k, j≤lk of
elements on L() such that:
• φ ↔ (φ1,1 ∨ · · · ∨φ1,l1)∧ . . .∧ (φk,1 ∨ · · · ∨φk,lk ) is a tautology of propositional
calculus, hence in T5(∅).
• For every i ≤ k, φi,1 ∈ Ln−1() (possibly ψ ′ ∧ ¬ψ ′), and for 2 ≤ j ≤ li , there
exists φ′i, j ∈ Ln−1() such that either φi, j = Kφ′i, j , or φi, j = ¬Kφ′i, j .
To prove that A3–A5 for φ are in T5(Ln−1()), it is enough to prove that A3–A5
for (φ1,1 ∨ · · · ∨ φ1,l1) ∧ · · · ∧ (φk,1 ∨ · · · ∨ φk,lk ) are in T5(Ln−1()). By successive
applications of Lemma 3, it is enough to prove that, for every i ≤ k, (φi,1 ∨· · ·∨φi,li )
is in T5(Ln−1()). We prove by induction on j that for every j ≤ li , A3–A5 for
(φi,1 ∨ · · · ∨ φi, j ) are in T5(Ln−1()). This is true for j = 1 since φi,1 ∈ Ln−1().
Assume this is true for j , then, by Lemma 5, A3–A5 for (φi,1 ∨ · · · ∨ φi, j ) ∨ φi, j+1
are in T5({φi,1 ∨ · · · ∨ φi, j , φi, j+1, ψ ′ ∧ ¬ψ ′}) ⊆ T5(Ln−1()). 
unionsq
Proof of the Main Theorem. It follows from Lemma 6 that for every n, T5(Ln()) =
T5(Ln−1()) = T 05 . Since T5 = ∪nTn(Ln()) = T 05 , T5 = T 05 . 
unionsq
3 Discussion
3.1 Partitional information structures
The standard modal logic system S5 is syntactic, in that it considers propositions
and a knowledge operator. In order to make the connection between S5 (or S50) and
partitional information, one needs to introduce the semantic representation, given by
states of the world.
The bridge between semantic and syntactic models consists of Kripke structures
(Kripke 1959), given as tuples M = (, π,K); is the set of states of nature; π :
123
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 ×  → {0, 1} is a function assigning a truth value to every primitive proposition,
i.e., π(ω, p) = 1 if and only if p is true at ω;K :  → 2 \ {∅} determines a binary
relationship on , often called the agent’s possibility correspondence, i.e., ω′ ∈ K(ω)
means that the agent deems the state ω′ possible while being at ω. We write (M, ω)  φ
whenever φ is true at ω in the Kripke structure M . Truth is defined inductively in M
at every state as follows:
(M, ω)  p for each p ∈  if and only if π(ω, p) = 1
(M, ω)  φ if and only if (M, ω)  ¬φ
(M, ω)  φ ∧ ψ if and only if (M, ω)  φ and (M, ω)  ψ
(M, ω)  Kφ if and only if (M, ω′)  φ for all ω′ ∈ K(ω)
Recall that M is reflexive whenever ω ∈ K(ω) for all ω ∈ ; it is transitive
whenever for all ω,ω′ ∈ , if ω′ ∈ K(ω) then K(ω′) ⊆ K(ω); finally, it is Euclidean
whenever for all ω,ω′ ∈ , if ω′ ∈ K(ω) then K(ω′) ⊇ K(ω). Partitional information
structures correspond to Kripke structures that are reflexive, transitive and Euclidean.
A proposition φ is a tautology in M , and we write M  φ, whenever (M, ω)  φ
for all ω ∈ . It is valid in a class of Kripke structures M, and we write M  φ,
whenever φ is a tautology in every M ∈ M.
An ML system is a sound axiomatization of a class of Kripke structuresMwhenever
every theorem in this ML system is a valid proposition in M. A modal logic system is
a complete axiomatization of M whenever every valid proposition in M is a theorem
in the ML system. It is well known that S5 is a sound and complete axiomatization of
partitional Kripke structures (see e.g.,Chellas 1980; Lismont and Mongin 1994).
It immediately follows from our Main Theorem that S50 is also a sound and com-
plete axiomatization of partitional Kripke structures.
3.2 Tightness of the result
We show that truth and introspection for the non-epistemic propositions are indis-
pensable axioms, i.e., A3–A5 cannot be proven only from A1–A2 and R1–R2, using
semantic models as introduced in the previous subsection.
Suppose, for instance, that there is a unique atomic proposition,  = {p}, and con-
sider a Kripke structure M such that  = {ω,ω′}, with π(ω, p) = 1 and π(ω′, p) = 0.
Moreover, let K(ω) = {ω} and K(ω′) = {ω,ω′}. It is known that M belongs to the
class of Kripke structures which are axiomatized by A1–A4 together with the infer-
ence rules2 R1–R2. Therefore, ¬K p → K¬K p cannot be proven in M , implying that
without assuming introspection for the non-epistemic propositions, we may obtain a
strictly coarser set of theorems compared to S5.
Likewise, unless the truth axiom is assumed for the non-epistemic propositions,
it cannot be proven by the remaining axioms. Consider, for instance, the following
Kripke structure, M ′, such that  = {ω,ω′}, with π(ω, p) = 1 and π(ω′, p) = 0,
and K(ω) = {ω′} and K(ω′) = {ω}. It is known that M ′ belongs to the class of Kripke
structures which are axiomatized by A1–A2, A4–A5 together with the inference rules
R1–R2 (Fagin et al. 1995), implying that K p → p cannot be proven in M ′.




A well-known result in the literature states that in S5 every proposition is equivalent
to a proposition of epistemic depth at most 1 (Hughes and Cresswell 1968, p. 51). In
other words, for every φ ∈ L() there is some ψ ∈ L1() such that φ ↔ ψ is a
theorem in S5. In this section we explain why the proof of our main theorem does not
follow this result.
First, observe that S5 is a ML system with a larger (with respect to inclusion) set of
axioms than S50, and therefore T 05 is a weak subset of T5. Hence, there is in principle
no reason why every proposition in  should be equivalent to a proposition in L1()
in S50.3
Second, the known proofs the aforementioned standard result, such as in Hughes
and Cresswell (1968) or Aumann (1999), make use of Theorems in S5 which are a
priori not Theorems in S50. Of course, this is legitimate while working in S5, but isn’t
in S50. For instance, Aumann’s proof (Lemma A.44) relies on Lemma A.41, which
states that K (Kφ ∨ ψ) ↔ (Kφ ∨ Kψ) is a theorem in S5. The proof of this lemma
makes use of the fact that the truth axiom holds for all propositions and therefore
applies A3 for (Kφ ∨ ψ). Obviously, this cannot be done in S50, without first having
proved that K (Kφ ∨ ψ) → (Kφ ∨ ψ) is a theorem in this system. Likewise, our
proof significantly differs from the one by Hughes and Cresswell (1968), in that they
in their definition of S5 they include a third inference rule, that of uniform replacing,
according to which in every theorem of S5, if we replace a primitive proposition with
any other proposition, the obtained proposition will also be a theorem. Though this
inference rule clearly can be used in S5, it is not straightforward without using our
main result that, if added in S50, it would not modify the set of theorems, T 05 .
3.4 Interactive knowledge
Let us extend our analysis to a framework with multiple agents {1, . . . , n}, with typical
elements i and j . Consider a separate knowledge modality Ki for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
implying that the set of all propositions, denoted by Ln(), now becomes the closure
of  with respect to ¬,∧ and K1, . . . , Kn , i.e., the language is enriched in order to
contain propositions of the form “ j knows that i knows p”.
The ML system, S5n , extends S5 to a multi-agent environment in which all axioms
of S5 hold for each agent separately. For instance, each agent’s knowledge satisfies
the truth axiom, i.e., Kiφ → φ is an axiom for all φ and every i .
Recall the definition of the non-epistemic propositions in the single-agent frame-
work: It is the set of sentences that do not contain any knowledge operator. Extending
this definition to the multi-agent framework should be done with caution, e.g., con-
sider the proposition “ j knows that i knows p”: From j’s point of view, K j Ki p is
epistemic, as it describes j’s knowledge; on the other hand, K j Ki p is a non-epistemic
proposition in i’s language as it describes j’s mental state, even though the latter refers
3 It is, of course, a consequence of our Main Theorem that is actually the case.
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to i’s knowledge. Hence, from i’s point of view any proposition starting with K j is
non-epistemic.
Formally, we define the set of non-epistemic propositions in i’s language










as the closure of
⋃
j =i {K jφ | φ ∈ L()} ∪  with respect to ¬ and ∧. Obviously,
when i is the only agent, it follows that L0i () = L0(), implying that our generalized
definition of non-epistemic propositions in the multi-agent environment is consistent
with the single-agent case presented in the previous section.
Let S50n be the multi-agent generalization of S50:
A1. All tautologies of propositional calculus
A2.
(
Kiφ ∧ Ki (φ → ψ)
) → Kiψ
A3. Kiφ → φ, for all φ ∈ L0i ()
A4. Kiφ → Ki Kiφ, for all φ ∈ L0i ()
A5. ¬Kiφ → Ki¬Kiφ, for all φ ∈ L0i ()
R1. From φ and (φ → ψ) infer ψ
R2. From φ infer Kiφ
Let T 05n denote the theorems in S50n .
Proposition 1 T5n = T 05n.
Proof Observe that L() coincides with the closure of L0i () with respect to ¬,∧
and Ki . Moreover, similarly to the Main Theorem, we show that i can prove A3–A5
for all propositions in the closure of L0i () with respect to ¬,∧ and Ki , and therefore
i can prove A3–A5 for all propositions in L(). Likewise, for every individual which
completes the proof. 
unionsq
It follows directly, from the previous result, that S50n is a sound and complete
axiomatization of the class of multi-agent partitional Kripke structures.
Notice that in order to prove A3–A5 for all propositions it does not suffice to assume
the truth axiom and introspection only for L0(), e.g., even if j assumes (Kiφ → φ),
he cannot prove (K j Kiφ → Kiφ). The reason is that, from j’s point of view, Kiφ is
a non-epistemic proposition, and therefore j cannot infer the truth axiom for Kiφ.
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